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11 Scientiﬁc imperialism and
explanatory appeals to evolution in
the social sciences
Stephen M. Downes
Introduction
In this chapter I focus on what the charge of scientiﬁc imperialism amounts to
and whether the charge is (always) appropriate in the case of the relation
between evolutionary biology and the social and behavioral sciences. I will
then brieﬂy introduce two very diﬀerent examples of this relationship: evolu-
tionary psychology and evolutionary linguistics. Here I hope to support the
claim that relations between evolution and the study of human behavior are
not all created equal. Next I move to a discussion of scientiﬁc imperialism and
the way in which the concept has been proposed, developed and defended.
Here I focus on John Dupré’s account of scientiﬁc imperialism, as this account
was developed to critically assess evolutionary psychology (along with eco-
nomics). I go on to propose an empirically based approach to scientiﬁc change
that I hope can help in identifying the strengths and limitations of appeals to
scientiﬁc imperialism. Here I will draw on an analogy between the ways in
which empirical approaches to scientiﬁc change helped reﬁne the notion of
scientiﬁc revolutions and the ways in which related empirical approaches may
help reﬁne our notion of scientiﬁc imperialism.
My interest in scientiﬁc imperialism stems from claims like this made by John
Dupré: “Evolutionary psychology can be seen as a failed imperialist adventure
from evolutionary biology” (Dupré 2001, 16). I have critically appraised evo-
lutionary psychology from a number of diﬀerent perspectives (see e.g. Downes
2015), and when I ﬁrst encountered Dupré’s charge of imperialism I assumed
that he was invoking an independent critical perspective on evolutionary psy-
chology. Here I will reassess this initial assumption. There are several issues that
are relevant to this reassessment. First, evolutionary psychology is a quite dis-
tinct “adventure” from evolutionary biology. There are other applications of
aspects of biological theory in the social and behavioral sciences that raise very
few eyebrows and do not seem to warrant the charge of imperialism, where
“imperialism” is understood as a pejorative term. Second, there are many critics
of evolutionary psychology who criticize it on the grounds that its proponents
do not pay enough attention to evolutionary biology and many base their cri-
tical attacks on evolutionary psychology in evolutionary theory. Third, the very
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notion of scientiﬁc imperialism has undergone some serious critical appraisal.
There are many promising analyses of scientiﬁc imperialism but there are still
plenty of issues unresolved (many of these issues are confronted in other chap-
ters in this volume). For example, if scientiﬁc imperialism is used in a pejorative
sense, is the charge an epistemic one or a moral one? Further, when we discuss
change in science in terms of scientiﬁc imperialism, are we discussing an issue
internal or external to science?
This latter issue invokes discussion of another political metaphor in philoso-
phy of science, Thomas Kuhn’s scientiﬁc revolutions (Kuhn 1962). I propose
that discussion of the metaphor of scientiﬁc imperialism in relation to empirical
work on scientiﬁc change can be as productive as discussion of Kuhn’s famous
metaphor of revolutions in relation to relevant empirical work. Finally, I touch
on the broader connections between empirical work, in the sociology of sci-
ence, for example, and the epistemic appraisal of scientiﬁc work. Can we say
that a given piece of scientiﬁc work is bad on the basis of an assessment of the
institutional practices scientists engage in without any detailed examination of
the relevant hypotheses and the testing of those hypotheses? Is it possible to
completely distinguish the assessment of institutional practice from epistemic
appraisal?
1 Evolution and the social sciences
In the conclusion of The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin says: “In the distant
future I see open ﬁelds for far more important researches. Psychology will be
based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental
power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man
and his history” (see e.g. Downes 2015). Darwin went on to write the Descent
of Man and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, delivering on his
promise rather than waiting for researchers in a distant future. Now, almost
every avenue of social and behavioral science has an evolutionary branch or
shows the inﬂuence of some kind of evolutionary thinking. Evolutionary
anthropology is a well-established part of anthropology with several in ﬁeld
journals and one or two entire departments dedicated only to this mode of
anthropological research. In cognitive psychology, a large percentage of
hypotheses are accompanied by some evolutionary speculation, such as to pos-
tulate that the psychological mechanism of interest is part of the evolutionarily
older part of the brain. Dual process theory in cognitive psychology is pre-
sented against the background of loosely evolutionary considerations. In the last
ten years, consumer studies researchers have proposed a reworking of their ﬁeld
that draws upon evolutionary ideas.
The kind of evolutionary thinking invoked in the wide range of social sci-
ences varies greatly. Also the ways in which the relevant evolutionary thinking
is brought into the diﬀerent social sciences varies greatly, as does the source of
the relevant evolutionary thought. This variation should be of great interest to
all of us interested in scientiﬁc imperialism and especially those of us who aim
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to understand the introduction of evolutionary ideas into the social sciences as a
case of scientiﬁc imperialism. I only lay out two brief examples of evolutionary
social sciences here, but I hope that the contrast between the two adequately
illustrates these points. I will brieﬂy discuss the well-known ﬁeld of evolu-
tionary psychology and then turn to a likely less familiar sub-discipline of the
larger ﬁeld of evolutionary linguistics.
2 Evolutionary psychology
Evolutionary psychology was proposed and defended by a number of diﬀerent
researchers in the late 1980s. Proponents of evolutionary psychology included
anthropologists and psychologists along with human sociobiologists and others
who studied human behavior. Some key experiments were championed by
evolutionary psychologists as providing strong support for evolutionary
hypotheses about the way the human mind works and leading thinkers in the
ﬁeld produced theoretical papers, and subsequently books, to lay out the key
theoretical tenets and methodologies of the new ﬁeld. Examples of this early
experimental work include David Buss (1989) on mate selection, Leda Cos-
mides (1989) on cheater detection and Devendra Singh (1993) on women’s
waist/hip ratio preferences in men. Theoretical work included John Tooby and
Cosmides’s (1992) long position paper on evolutionary psychology, which they
shortened into the still highly cited and much more accessible primer on Evo-
lutionary Psychology (1997), and papers by Buss. Buss also wrote the ﬁrst evolu-
tionary psychology textbook (1999) and edited The Handbook of Evolutionary
Psychology (2005).
Evolutionary psychology has always been highly visible, thanks in large part
to the success of popular works championing the ﬁeld. Robert Wright’s The
Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary
Psychology (1994) and Steven Pinker’s How the Mind Works (1997) are hugely
popular works. Each author provides nice, accessible introductions to evolu-
tionary psychology and also vehemently attacks all work on the social and
behavioral sciences that does not appeal to evolution or, worse still, that is in
direct opposition to evolutionary approaches. There are many other popular
evolutionary psychology books and several of these are highly controversial and
provocative. Books such as Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s A Natural
History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (2000) and Buss’s The Murderer
Next Door: Why The Mind is Designed to Kill (2005) proved incredibly con-
troversial and are lightning rods for much of the backlash against evolutionary
psychology.
Taking a look at Buss’s (1995) theoretical paper and Clark Barrett’s (2015)
recent book helps us understand what evolutionary psychologists proposed at
the outset and reveals the central tenets of the now somewhat more mature
ﬁeld. Buss challenges his colleagues in psychology, saying: “Psychological sci-
ence is currently in conceptual disarray, characterized by unconnected mini-
theories and isolated empirical ﬁndings. […] Evolutionary psychology provides
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the conceptual tools for emerging from this fragmented state” (Buss 1995, 1).
The relevant conceptual tools include treating the human mind as a collection
of adaptations that were selected to solve the various adaptive problems our
ancestors faced.
Understanding organs as adaptations is a key component of evolutionary
biology. Darwin countered design theorists such as Paley by defending the
view that an organ as complex as the human eye could arise as the result of
gradual modiﬁcation, guided by selection, over huge stretches of time. Adapt-
ing Darwin, evolutionary psychologists propose that we understand the mind as
a collection of highly adapted mental organs and we account for the existence
of these mental organs by appealing to adaptation or natural selection. Evolu-
tionary psychologists argue that this account of the human mind better explains
the results of experiments on human preferences and on human reasoning.
Singh’s work on waist/hip ratio preferences in men involves ﬁrst showing a
convergence on a particular preferred waist/hip ratio and then explaining this
convergence by appealing to an evolved mental mechanism that helps men
achieve success in mate selection (see e.g. Singh 1993). Buss provides this
assessment of the promise of evolutionary psychology:
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, many traditional dis-
ciplinary boundaries are not merely arbitrary but are misleading and detri-
mental to progress. They imply boundaries that cleave mechanisms in
arbitrary and unnatural ways. Studying human psychology via adaptive
problems and their solutions provides a natural means of “cleaving nature
at its joints” and hence crossing current disciplinary boundaries.
(Buss 1995, 1)
Assessing the current state of play in evolutionary psychology 20 years after
Buss’s paper, Barrett says: “Unfortunately, the rise of evolutionary psychology
has led to rampant generation of evolution-ﬂavored hypotheses throughout the
social sciences, not all of which pass basic tests of evolutionary plausibility”
(Barrett 2015, 12). Barrett claims: “When done properly, evolutionary psy-
chology is just evolutionary biology applied to the mind” (ibid., 12). Barrett’s
aim is to realign evolutionary psychology with evolutionary thinking in gen-
eral. He argues that “not all evolutionary hypotheses are created equal, and that
careful thinking about how evolution actually works […] can get you a long
way” (ibid., 12), and aims to provide “an evolutionary psychology grounded as
rigorously as possible in the logic of biology – the logic of evolution – and no
other” (ibid., 12). Barrett is convinced that “the fact that human minds are
products of evolution is something that we can be as sure of as any other fact in
biology” (ibid., 12). Echoing Buss, Barrett claims that evolutionary models are
far preferable “than the currently rather impoverished set of models in psy-
chology” (ibid., 12). Evolutionary psychologists claim to oﬀer their colleagues
in psychology and other social sciences a stronger explanatory repertoire that
can account for a wide range of phenomena.
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3 Evolutionary linguistics
I now turn to a contrasting example of work in the social sciences inﬂuenced by
evolution: Russell Gray and his colleagues’work on human migration in the Paciﬁc
(Gray et al. 2009; Gray and Jordan 2000). In the 1990s there were two main
hypotheses about the original human settlement of the Micronesian and Polynesian
Paciﬁc islands and neighboring areas. One hypothesis is that this settlement process
was quite rapid. This is referred to as the “express train” hypothesis. The other
hypothesis is of a slower and less direct migration pattern with looping and back-
tracking, sometimes referred to as the “entangled bank” model. Linguists have
observed that the inhabitants of the Paciﬁc all share related languages. Gray
proposed that quantitative phylogenetic techniques could be applied to the analysis of
languages and tree structures relating relevant languages could be proposed and
tested. In phylogenetics, trees are produced to assess hypotheses about relations
between segments of DNA. Gray observes that languages have a syntactic structure
that is amenable to similar analysis. Gray notes that despite the parallels between
biological and linguistic evolution, before him, no linguists had appealed to the
“quantitative phylogenetic methods that have revolutionized evolutionary
biology in the last 20 years” (Gray and Jordan 2000, 1052; Gray et al. 2009).
Gray and his colleagues produced several trees and assessed the best trees for
the language data sets using statistical methods from quantitative phylogenetics.
In their ﬁrst work of this kind, they found that the topology of their language
tree “was highly compatible with the express train model” (Gray and Jordan
2000, 1052). In more recent work, they developed language trees that were
compatible with the “pause-pulse” model of human settlement as opposed to
its main competitor, the “slow-boat diﬀusion” model. Gray and his colleagues
exploit the similarity between lexical items and sections of DNA and use the
techniques from evolutionary biology used to discover relations between sec-
tions of DNA. At this stage of the work, there are no grand claims about the
applicability of evolution to all of linguistics or other areas of social science.
Rather, Gray and his colleagues have introduced a technique from evolutionary
biology into one area of work in linguistics and the study of early human
migration. There is potential for the application of phylogenetic analysis to
other aspects of human cultural evolution, and Fiona Jordan (see e.g. Jordan
2013) has made some cautious forays into this area.
4 Scientiﬁc imperialism
I now turn to scientiﬁc imperialism. Recall that my interest in scientiﬁc imperialism
was sparked by Dupré’s claim that “[e]volutionary psychology can be seen as a
failed imperialist adventure from evolutionary biology” (Dupré 2001, 16). My focus
therefore will be on Dupré’s notion of scientiﬁc imperialism. My understanding of
Dupré’s notion of scientiﬁc imperialism has been greatly helped by work by
Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh (2009, 2013), and Uskali Mäki (2009, 2013),
and their inﬂuence will be seen in what follows here.
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Dupré says that scientiﬁc imperialism is “the tendency for a successful scien-
tiﬁc idea to be applied far beyond its original home, and generally with
decreasing success the more its application is expanded” (Dupré 2001, 16). I
agree with Clarke and Walsh (2009) that Dupré uses imperialism in a pejorative
sense and also agree with them that this is clearly a political metaphor used in
the service of understanding science. The most familiar political metaphor in
the philosophy of science is Kuhn’s (1962) scientiﬁc revolution. I return to
scientiﬁc revolutions below. Clarke and Walsh (2009) emphasize the normative
dimension of Dupré’s scientiﬁc imperialism. They express this normative
dimension as follows: “In the human sciences, scientiﬁc imperialism raises an
additional concern, which is that important human values could fail to be
expressed, and we might become the sorts of people that, on reﬂection, we would
not wish to have become” (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 205). I agree that Dupré is
concerned that scientizing the study of human behavior can lead to a lack of
appreciation for values but I also think that there is a strongly epistemic nor-
mative component to Dupré’s charge of scientiﬁc imperialism. He thinks that
scientiﬁc imperialism produces bad science not just science that leads us to devalue
ourselves. Mäki asks an important question in this context too: is evolutionary
psychology bad science independent of any considerations about scientiﬁc
imperialism (Mäki 2013, 238)? Dupré certainly has argued on independent
grounds that evolutionary psychology is bad science but I take him also to be
arguing that it is bad science because of its imperialism. Let us look at Dupré’s
version of scientiﬁc imperialism in a little more detail to see if this holds up.
Dupré says “imperialistic economics is a deliberate attempt to import the
perspective of economics into many diverse facets of human behavior” (Dupré
2001, 16). I think he would be happy with the following reworking of this
claim: imperialistic evolutionary psychology is a deliberate attempt to import
the perspective of evolutionary biology into many diverse facets of human
behavior. According to Dupré, the problem here is that the imperialist imposes
a general structural, or scientiﬁc theoretical, perspective irrespective of the nuan-
ces of context. He goes on to spell this out by discussing structure. The idea is
that if you take yourself to have an account of the underlying structure of
something, say human beings, you apply that structural account whenever you
come across a human being. Dupré says that taking note of the relevant context
will undermine such structural accounts and they will be “doomed to failure”
(ibid., 16). The positive side to Dupré’s proposal is pluralism, which he con-
trasts with imperialism. He says that we cannot properly understand any central
features of human life from “any unique and homogeneous perspective” and
“[t]he moral of pluralism, therefore, is not to point to better ways of doing
science […] but to show the limits of science, at least in its application to the
complexities of human life” (ibid., 17). Dupré admits that what he takes to be a
problem with imperialist ventures in science is for others a mark of their success
and what makes them attractive to their adherents. For example, he thinks that
what attracts people to evolutionary psychology is its “claims to breadth of
application” (ibid., 81). He also says that “[o]bvious rewards and attractions
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accrue to the pursuit of scientiﬁc ideas with the greatest claims to generality of
application” (ibid., 84). Dupré is not just concerned with generality understood
in terms of the wide scope of application of the imperialist science but also in
the sense that imperialist sciences stay above the level of what matters empiri-
cally. Evolutionary psychologists’ “most imperialistic moments,” he says, “are
also the moments at which they are most inclined to substitute purely formal
demonstrations of possibility for the hard work of demonstrating actuality”
(ibid., 138). Perhaps the following characterization, which I have adapted from
Mäki’s analysis of imperialist economics, best captures Dupré’s scientiﬁc
imperialism:
Evolutionary psychology is an example of scientiﬁc imperialism as it is the
result of scientiﬁc expansionism of evolutionary biology. Evolutionary
psychology locates new types of explanandum phenomena in psychology
and other social sciences, and evolutionary psychology presents itself
hegemonically as being in possession of superior theories and methods,
thereby excluding rival theories and approaches from consideration.
(adapted from Mäki 2009, 374)
Further, Dupré takes the newly imported theories to be mistaken in various
ways and hence detrimental to psychology and other social sciences. This
assessment is made on independent grounds from the attribution of imperialism
but bringing mistaken theories to bear renders the imperialism more pernicious.
Dupré presents what I take to be a somewhat diﬀerent view of scientiﬁc
imperialism from the one outlined above when he says the following: “whe-
ther it is from commendable epistemological enthusiasm, or from the desire to
become rich and famous through writing best selling books, the tendency to
exaggerate the scope of the theory with which one is professionally engaged is
a familiar aspect of scientiﬁc life. I referred to this phenomenon above as scientiﬁc
imperialism” (Dupré 2001, 82, emphasis added). This seems to be a distinct
notion from the one we have been focusing on so far. Clearly this notion is
related but it pertains to popularizers of imperialistic science rather than prac-
titioners. He gives examples: “physicists envisage ﬁnal theories of everything,
and not surprisingly these turn out to be physical theories” and “Darwinians, or
their camp-followers, make almost equally ambitious claims. Recall the remark
from Dennett […] ‘Darwin’s dangerous idea is reductionism incarnate, pro-
mising to unite and explain almost everything in one magniﬁcent vision’”
(ibid., 82). I agree that popularizers of various sciences tend to exaggerate their
scope of application but I take the charge of scientiﬁc imperialism to be part of
an epistemic criticism of the relevant science rather than part of a critical
appraisal of popular science writing. It is certainly annoying when popular sci-
ence writers exaggerate and misrepresent the claims of the scientists they pro-
mote but the relevant scientists are not directly responsible for these
exaggerated claims. There are many popular works that focus on sciences that
promote easily digestible and widely applicable general ideas and so the
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approach to science may inﬂuence its broad appeal. It should be noted, though,
that there are also bestsellers, for example, Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of
Time (1988), whose content is completely obscure to most lay readers and yet
sales indicate that this work has wide appeal. A detailed sociological examina-
tion of evolutionary psychology will doubtless reveal various connections
between popular works on progress in the ﬁeld and actual practice in the lab.
For now, though, I want to focus just on Dupré’s narrower version of scientiﬁc
imperialism, characterized in Mäki’s terms.
5 Empirical challenges for claims of imperialism
Kuhn (1962) characterizes scientiﬁc change in terms of scientiﬁc revolutions.
We all grasp the outlines of Kuhn’s view. A period of normal science guided
by a paradigm starts to break down and a period of revolutionary science takes
over. Many philosophers of science argue that Kuhn’s approach to scientiﬁc
change is irrationalist or arational, but many in history and sociology of science
are not as worried about this issue and focus more on the facts on the ground
in times of scientiﬁc change. The issues here are the extent to which Kuhn’s
characterization ﬁts with the way in which actual theory change occurs in sci-
ence or the way in which theory change has occurred in speciﬁc instances in
the history of science. Mäki asks “what does it take to empirically identify
instances of scientiﬁc imperialism?” (Mäki 2013, 338). As he points out,
though, there are currently a number of diﬀerent notions of scientiﬁc imperi-
alism. Rather than trying to identify instances of scientiﬁc imperialism empiri-
cally, I propose comparing particular versions of scientiﬁc imperialism to the
relevant empirical facts in their speciﬁc domain of application. I focus on some
of Dupré’s claims about evolutionary psychology as an imperialist venture and
contrast them with some empirical observations about the ﬁeld. First, I brieﬂy
outline an analogous move directed at Kuhn.
One question about scientiﬁc change is how the new theory/paradigm/
research program, etc. can take hold when the folks who held the old view are
still around. Kuhn held that Planck’s principle was explanatorily relevant here.
Planck said that new theories do not come to the fore because opponents to
the theory come to accept it, but rather the opponents die oﬀ. A related idea of
Planck’s, popular among many scientists and historians and philosophers of
science, is that younger scientists take up newer ideas more readily. David Hull
and his collaborators (Hull et al. 1978) point out that these claims are open to
empirical test, as the birth and death records of scientists throughout history are
readily available. Hull also points out that it is more diﬃcult to assess when
scientists come to adopt “various positions on scientiﬁc issues,” but not
impossible. Hull focuses on the incredibly rapid adoption of Darwin’s ideas in
Britain shortly after the publication of The Origin of Species. In a mere ten years
after the publication of The Origin of Species, Darwin’s ideas had become
dominant. Not all relevant scientists accepted Darwin’s ideas after ten years, but
Hull’s ﬁnding is that “age explains less than 10 percent of the variation in
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acceptance” (ibid., 202). The Darwinian revolution may have come about due
to extra-scientiﬁc factors but Hull reveals that the age of scientists was not one
of the most important factors.
Dupré makes a number of claims about the imperialism of evolutionary
psychology that are open to empirical investigation. One is that evolutionary
psychology is an “imperialist adventure from evolutionary biology” (Dupré
2001, 16). Evolutionary psychologists certainly couch their claims in evolu-
tionary language but the most consistent criticism of evolutionary psychology
since its inception is one or other version of the claim that evolutionary psy-
chologists do not have the biology right. A related criticism is that evolutionary
psychologists do not carry out experiments that confront evolutionary
hypotheses. Evolutionary biologists have been some of the harshest critics of
evolutionary psychology. John Maynard Smith claimed that evolutionary psy-
chologists had not produced any models that were ready for appropriate testing.
Richard Lewontin has argued that evolutionary psychologists employ an
impoverished notion of adaption, and Jerry Coyne (see e.g. Coyne 2009)
attacks evolutionary psychology on a number of evolutionary grounds. Clark
Barrett’s (2015) recent assessment of evolutionary psychology includes voicing
concerns over how far from evolutionary theory his evolutionary psychology
colleagues have strayed. Perhaps evolutionary psychology is an imperialist ven-
ture but it is a homegrown one. The appropriate political metaphor here is
perhaps a coup, a movement cooked up by insiders using what they take to be
the conceptual tools of a ﬁeld that they admire. If the empire is not backing
your adventure, it is perhaps not an imperialist adventure.
As we have seen, Dupré sees a connection between ideas with general
applicability and imperialist moves in science. He also says “[o]bvious rewards
and attractions accrue to the pursuit of scientiﬁc ideas with the greatest claims
to generality of application” (Dupré 2001, 84). This sounds right, but like
Planck’s claims about science, it is also amenable to empirical investigation.
One way in which we can measure both the rewards an idea accrues and its
attractiveness is via citation analysis. If we assume for now that this is a rea-
sonable measure, let us use it to test Dupré’s claim. Recent research on the
most-cited work of all time reveals a rather surprising result with respect to the
generality of scientiﬁc work (Van Noorden et al. 2014). The most-cited paper
of all time is a paper describing an assay for determining the amount of protein
in a solution. No groundbreaking theoretical papers in any ﬁeld, such as theo-
retical work leading to Nobel Prizes, come anywhere close to the top 100
most-cited papers. The top 100 papers are overwhelmingly those characterizing
biological techniques (see Figure 11.1, for more data such as this). Certainly
some of this work has led to Nobel Prizes but none of this work is para-
digmatically general. The work certainly has wide applicability in experimental
contexts and is tremendously useful but it is not work of the scope of the
General Theory of Relativity. Citation analysis is only one way to measure the
success and attractiveness of scientiﬁc ideas but if we use citations as an index of
success, generality is not the route to success in science. It should be noted that
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citation analysis does not provide clear access to epistemic success. For example,
increased citation count could simply mean increased popularity. However,
there are good reasons to believe that scientiﬁc works are cited, for the most
part, for their scientiﬁc content. This indicates that we should have some con-
ﬁdence in the conclusion here that generality is not a sure route to success in
science.
Figure 11.1
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I have no doubt that various non-epistemic factors play an important role in sus-
taining evolutionary psychology but I am skeptical that evolutionary psychology is
sustained by evolutionary biologists and I am also skeptical that it is successful
because its ideas have general applicability. It may be true that evolutionary psy-
chology has popular appeal because it appears to be based in evolutionary biology
and, when sloganized, its central ideas seem widely applicable. As I mentioned
above, though, I think that the popular uptake of a given scientiﬁc ﬁeld is neither
a measure of its success nor a mark of the extent to which it is imperialist.
6 Conclusion
If the evidence supports my claim that evolutionary psychology is not sup-
ported by evolutionary biology and is therefore not best understood as an
“adventure from evolutionary biology,” perhaps that component can be drop-
ped from our characterization of Dupré’s scientiﬁc imperialism. Recall, I bor-
rowed from Mäki to give this characterization: “Evolutionary psychology is an
example of scientiﬁc imperialism as it is the result of scientiﬁc expansionism of
evolutionary biology. Evolutionary psychology locates new types of expla-
nandum phenomena in psychology and other social sciences, and evolutionary
psychology presents itself hegemonically as being in possession of superior the-
ories and methods, thereby excluding rival theories and approaches from con-
sideration” (adapted from Mäki 2009, 374). Here is a characterization without
the clause about expansionism from evolutionary biology: “Evolutionary psy-
chology is an example of scientiﬁc imperialism as it locates new types of
explanandum phenomena in psychology and other social sciences, and evolu-
tionary psychology presents itself hegemonically as being in possession of
superior theories and methods, thereby excluding rival theories and approaches
from consideration.” This perhaps better captures the activity of evolutionary
psychologists on the ground, but without the expansionist component, does this
adequately capture scientiﬁc imperialism? Is a hegemonic approach coupled with
a broadening of the scope of application and excluding rival theories suﬃcient
for imperialism?
Evolutionary psychology is clearly a very diﬀerent endeavor from the type of
evolutionary linguistics I introduced earlier. Evolutionary psychologists are very
confrontational in their approach to their fellow social scientists and much of
their work has a triumphal air to it. Even Barrett, who is relatively moderate in
his approach, champions evolutionary psychology over the “impoverished set
of models in psychology” (Barrett 2015, 12). I am not sure if reﬁning our
notion of scientiﬁc imperialism will help us better understand a ﬁeld like evo-
lutionary psychology. Perhaps other related political metaphors are more
appropriate in this context. I do think that careful empirical analysis of evolu-
tionary psychology, such as citation analysis, may reveal more about the
dynamics of the ﬁeld and help us understand its success in the face of apparently
cogent and damaging criticism of its central ideas. In contrast, evolutionary
linguistics appears not to be a candidate for scientiﬁc imperialism in Dupré’s
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terms. The evolutionary linguists considered above do not present their
approach in order to exclude rivals, and display none of the hegemonic ten-
dencies Dupré sees in evolutionary psychology. The case of evolutionary lin-
guistics does reveal problems for Dupré, as if scientiﬁc imperialism in this
domain simply consisted in transporting evolutionary views into social science,
then it too would be imperialist. To rule out evolutionary linguistics as a case
of imperialism requires stressing the clause about excluding rival theories and
approaches. Finally, the introduction of careful empirical analysis − such as
citation analysis − of any proposed imperialist science should help the philoso-
phical task of better characterizing scientiﬁc imperialism.
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